Notes

3 Ibid, line 138.

5 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. S. Mackenna (1991), III. 5, 2. and V. 8, 12 (hereafter Enn.).

6 One is here reminded of the painting by Rubens entitled Saturn.

8 As Pegis (1942) says, 'The whole of being must be considered not only as being but also as non-being, for non-being is the mysterious co-principle of its interior intelligibility', p. 157.

10 By employing such a phrase I am endeavouring to implicate the work of Levinas within this tradition. See Levinas (1991). I would also be keen to include Jean-Luc Marion within the same; see Marion (1991). See Part II, Chapter 10 where Levinas is briefly discussed.

11 This idea of non-production is important because it embodies the notion of the nothing as something. Throughout this book I refer to this non-production as provision. I employ this word because of its suggestive etymology. For the word provide stems from the word pro, which means before, and the word videre, which means to see. In this way I intend to suggest that the provenance of nihilism is to provide before provision. For example, the provenance of nihilism enables us to be without being, say without saying something and so on. One need only think of Saussure, for whom language was bereft of positive terms. This provision is, then, the nothing as something. See Part II, Chapter 10.

13 The reason why the One (or Hegel's infinite) is not apart from all that falls beneath it, yet is not identical to it, is because of their proximity. That is to say, the One is so close to the many, ontologically speaking, that the many cannot form a wholly separate identity from which the One could be completely apart or with which the One could be equated. The same goes for the finite in Hegel. For Hegel does not simply equate the infinite with the finite, nor does he argue that they are separate. This is because the finite is too ontologically close to the infinite to be able to develop a separate identity (an ontological difference) that could accommodate either severing or joining. See Part I, Chapter 5.

15 See Part II, Chapter 9.

21 Ibid.

26 This is the problem facing the omnipotent God of Ockham and Descartes.

28 In Part II, Chapter 10 the possibility of nihilism being read in terms of given-ness is considered. In this way the nothing as something could be interpreted as a sign of creation.

29 See Kaplan (1999).

30 I agree with Gadamer when he argues that Plato's one is not Plotinus' hen (One). For Plato's one and indeed the Good are the dialectical unity involved in the many. In this way the one is more about the dialectic between peras (limit), and aperion (unlimited, indefinite); see Gadamer (1986b), pp. 28-29, and p. 137. More generally see Klein (1968).

31 Avicenna, Nadjat, p. 365; Plotinus Enneads V, quoted in Afnan (1958), p. 114.

32 Such mutual constitution continually reappears throughout this book. For example, in Spinoza God is Nature, while Nature is God; in Hegel the finite is the infinite, the infinite is the finite; in Derrida the Text is defined by the Nothing outside it, while the Nothing is defined by the Text to which it is 'exterior'.

33 As Pegis (1942) argues, 'From Platonic realism to nominalism the line of descent is both direct and inevitable', p. 172. I would argue that it is Neoplatonism which leads us to nominalism. Plato leaves open other possibilities, and such interpretations are beginning to be explored by John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock.

35 Fabro (1970), p. 100. In this article Fabro argues that Neoplatonism leads to 'Death of God' theology.

36 Pegis (1942), p. 174. See also Azcoul (1995), pp. 86-101, who also argues that Plotinus is both a pantheist and a monist.

37 Gerson argues that to read Plotinus as espousing a henology is to ignore the specific causation of finite being, as opposed to being in general; see Gerson (1994), pp. 236-237, fn. 44. On henology see Aertsen (1992b).

38 For a translation of Avicenna's Metaphysica, taken from the Al-Shifa (the Healing), see Avicenna (1973b); for a French translation see Anawati (1978). For a translation of the Logica, see Avicenna (1974). There are also two other translations of works on logic: see Avicenna (1973a) and (1984). Translations from the Metaphysics Compendium, which is a summary of the Shifa, are from secondary literature. For a general biography, with an introduction to Avicenna's works on theology and accompanying translations, see Avicenna (1951).

39 This principle embodies a notion of creation involving a double necessity. First, that of mediated creation, and second, necessary emanation, because the Necessary Being creates only by nature.

40 See Zedler (1948), p. 149; see also idem (1976); more generally see idem (1981).

41 'Avicenna does not recognise contingency as an ontological modality, but only as a condition in the nature of things', Goichon (1948), pp. 58-59. For Avicenna 'modality is determined on the level of quiddities in themselves', Back (1992), p. 237.

42 These questions come from Aristotle's four questions in the Posterior Analytics: an sit, quid sit, quia est or quiale est, and propter quid sit.

43 'To those things which have quiddities that are possible per se, being, does not accrue except extrinsically but the first principle does not have any quiddity', Avicenna, Metaphysica, tract. viii, cap. 4, fol. 99r. Esse is 'something that happens to an essence, or something that happens to its nature', Metaphysica, tract. v, fol. 87, quoted by Zedler (1976), p. 509. For Averroes' critique of Avicenna on being as an accident, see the eighth discussion in Tahafut al-Tahafut, in Averroes (1954), p. 235. For the place that Gundissalinus, Avicenna's Latin translator, played in Aquinas' interpretation of Avicenna's understanding of being as an accident see O'Shaughnessy (1960).

44 Metaphysica, tract. i,. cap. 66, fol. 72, vi. See Owens (1970), p. 4.

46 'In Avicenna the esse proprium of the essence enjoyed a priority over being in reality and its being in the mind', Owens (1970), p. 11.

47 An essence was 'in itself possibly existent. For if it had not been possibly existent in itself it never would exist at all', Metaphysics Compendium, bk. I, pt. 2, tract. 6, 54-56; quoted by Adams (1987), p. 1068; 'Every being which is necessary through another not itself, is possible in itself, ibid., cap. III, p. 69; quoted by Owens (1970), p. 4.

48 Metaphysics Compendium, cap. II, 69; quoted by Smith (1943), p. 342.

50 Metaphysica, tract. v, cap. 1. This horse is the animal found in Avicenna's Logica: 'Animal is in itself a certain something, and it is the same whether it is sensible or understood in the soul. But in itself its being is neither universal nor singular . . . animal in itself is whatever animal is understood in the mind to be, and according to what animal is understood to be, it is animal only. But if in addition to this it be understood to be universal or singular or something else, then in addition to what animal is, there is understood something that happens to animality', Logica, 1, fol. 2rb; 'Equinity in itself is nothing but equinity, for in itself it is neither one nor many, nor existing in concrete individuals nor in the mind', Metaphysica, tract. v, cap. 1. For this reason, being is something 'that happens to essence or something that accompanies its nature', Logica, 1, fol. 87ra. This beast reappears in Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus.

51 This univocity is more apparent if we understand that the extrinsic nature of being cannot but make everything be in a univocal manner, but, more importantly, for Avicenna the intellect receives a primary impression of being which naturally prescinds from divine or creaturely consideration. Being is a flat eternal plane without beginning or end (see Metaphysics Compendium, I, 1, tract. 7). Being only leads us to the essences, which are eternal yet deserving of non-being.

53 See Goichon (1956), pp. 109-110 for a translation of the text: Shifa, I, 281.

56 Gardet (1951), p. 555; quoted by Goichon (1969), p. 13.

59 Ibid.

60 God 'comprehends the particular things in so far as they are universals', Nadjat, 404, quoted by Goichon (1969), p. 22. In contrast see Aquinas De Veritate, q. 2, a. 5 and a. 6.

65 Gardet (1951), p. 549. Quoted by Goichon (1969), pp. 31-32, fn. 1. Avicenna argues that essences 'do not deserve to be . . . they deserve privation', Metaphysica, tract. viii, cap. 6. See Gilson (1952a), p. 78.

66 'Everything having a quiddity is caused', Metaphysica, tract. viii, cap. 4, fol. 99r.

67 Metaphysica, tract. viii, cap. 4; quoted in Zedler (1976), p. 510.

69 See Metaphysica, tract. vii, cap. 4, fol. 99r. See also Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 5; Gilson (1952a), p. 80; (1978), p. 127; (1994), p. 456, fn. 26; Burrell (1986), p. 26. What the necessary existent does have is anniyya; see Frank (1956) for the history and meaning of this term. Anniyya appears to mean existence. There is little doubt that Avicenna did allow for an understanding of being which considered it an accident, but in fairness to Avicenna it may be better to consider such a 'doctrine' a blunder; see Burrell (1986), p. 26. This blunder seems to have been a sure sign of the limitations of Avicenna's metaphysical system. Anawati (1978) blames the development on Avicenna starting 'with essence in such a way as to arrive at the existing (esse) which effects it as though it were an accident', p. 78. Macierowski (1988) challenges this interpretation of Avicenna, arguing that Avicenna did not mean to assert that the first necessary being did not have an essence; this article contains a collection of translated texts relevant to the issue. But, as O'Shaughnessy (1960) argues, 'even the most favourable construction put on Avicenna, however, cannot obscure the fact that in his metaphysical system the real order tends often to appear as a projection of the logical', p. 679. The absolute consideration of an essence, for example the animal in the Logica, which becomes the horse in the Metaphysica, and the Metaphysics Compendium, generates a realm apart from God. These essences considered in an absolute manner, along with the first impression of being, engender a realm before a consideration of God. We are able to consider essences as the truth of things. But these essences are possible in themselves, and so are independent of God. Furthermore, being, in its first impression, does not involve a consideration of God. For this reason, being, not God, is the subject of metaphysics. What this seems to mean is that essences, as eternal possibilities, independent of God, and being as a first impression on the soul, allow for an understanding of truth and being apart from God, even though these essences have no truth or being, as such; see Cronin (1966), p. 177. All that which is, accrues being extrinsically. Yet in so doing they are in no need of being, or rather being is of no concern. This is especially pertinent when we consider that being, which is accidental to all that is, is God yet can be rightly considered apart from God. Here we have the nothing as something. Metaphysics is about being, but being, because it is considered apart from God, leads us to the essences which are eternal; eternally nothing, even when they are. As a result we can agree with Paulus (1938), when he says that in Avicenna, 'Epistemology commands and subsumes ontology', p. 12. Metaphysics becomes, in a sense, the science of non-being qua non-being.

70 Smith (1943), p. 347. Cronin (1966) concurs, saying, 'In the doctrine of Avicenna the possible in itself is set over and against God . . . for God the possible is a datum given to, not by, Him', p. 175. Francis Cunningham finds the idea of a realm of independent possibles in Avicenna 'libelous': see F. A. Cunningham (1974), p. 197.

72 As Cronin (1966), pp. 176-177; italics mine. See Metaphysica, tract. viii, cap. 6, fol. 100ra.

73 Metaphysica, tract. i, cap. 2, 5; quoted by Zedler (1948), p. 134; italics mine.

74 Ibid., italics mine.

76 Gardet (1951), p. 557; quoted by Goichon (1969), pp. 27-28.

78 'Henry drew his inspiration both from Avicenna and Neoplatonism', Clarke (1982), p. 124. Pegis (1968) speaks of Ghent's 'preference for Avicenna', p. 246; see also Pegis (1942), where he speaks of 'the Avicennian persuasions of Henry of Ghent', p. 170. Marrone (1985) argues that 'the origin of [Ghent's] ideas went back to Avicenna', and, 'Henry's thought seems to have been particularly sympathetic to Neoplatonism', pp. 105, 141; Paulus (1938), suggests that Ghent paid 'a greater attention to Neoplatonic theories', p. 148, and Ch. 2 generally.

80 See Paulus (1938), pp. 87-103 for a discussion of Ghent on ideas.

81 See Part II for a discussion of Aquinas.

83 See Summa Theologiae, q. 2, a. 21; cited in Dumont (1998), p. 300.

86 Ghent develops his notion of indistinct conception in Summa Theologiae, q. 2, a. 21-24. See also Marrone (1988), p. 33.

88 On Ghent's esse essentiae, see Cronin (1966), pp. 178-186; Marrone (1985), pp. 105-113.

90 Paulus (1938) argues that Aquinas, unlike Ghent, knows only the divine essence as the source of divine ideas, see p. 101; see Pegis (1942), p. 176.

91 As Pegis (1942) says, concerning Ghent's doctrine of divine ideas, 'Avicenna has the ascendancy over St Augustine. And this Ascendancy means . . . an introduction of the Platonic forms into the divine intellect as an order of essences, really distinct from the divine essence and really distinct in their essential being', p. 175. See Maurer (1990), p. 370; Pegis (1969) and (1971).

92 This is why Clarke (1982) accuses Ghent of deontologizing the divine ideas; see p. 124.

93 Summa Theologiae (hereafter Summa), q. 68, a. 5, 7-14; quoted by Clarke (1982), p. 124.

95 Summa, q. 68, a. 5, 7-14. This passage is quoted by Pegis (1942), pp. 176-177; and Clarke (1982), p. 124.

96 Sylwanowicz (1996), p. 188.

97 Summa, q. 2, a. 21; quoted in Brown (1965), p. 121.

98 Quodlibetal Questions, q. IX, 2; quoted in Paulus (1938), p. 91, n. 1; Pegis (1942), pp. 175-176; Clarke (1982), p. 124.

99 As Marrone (1988) says, Ghent 'wanted to create some sort of ontological category half-way between fiction and actuality', p. 38.

101 Quodlibetal Questions, V, q. 3; see Adams (1987), ch. 25.

102 For Scotus' texts see Scotus (1950). Relevant translations are A Treatise on God as First Principle (1966); God and Creatures (1975); Philosophical Writings (1987); Contingency and Freedom, Lectura, 1, 39, see Vos (1994); Duns Scotus Metaphysician (1995).

104 As Gilson (1927) says: 'The doctrine of the univocity of Being is represented in Duns Scotus' eyes by Avicenna's Philosophy', p. 147; but Gilson does make the point that the two philosophies must not be confused. The true difference resides in Scotus' formalism, see ibid., p. 187; see also Gilson (1952b), pp. 84-94 for a comparison of Duns Scotus and Avicenna. See also Marrone (2001), vol. 2, pp. 493-494.

105 'Duns Scotus has not radically altered the Avicennian notion of being', Gilson (1952a), p. 89.

106 Ibid., p. 84. 'Duns Scotus adopts the whole metaphysics of essence from Avicenna', Klaus Jacobi (1983), p. 107. The term 'metaphysics of essence' comes from Gilson (1952b), p. 109.

110 Lectura, I, d. 43, q. un, n. 22; see Marrone (1996), p. 181.

111 See Knuuttila (1996), who puts it like this: 'Scotus thought that God first knows His essence in itself and then thinks about whatever else could be (the distinction is logical not temporal). It is only "after" this act of thinking about possible beings in themselves that God thinks about the relation of ideas to His essence', pp. 135-136. Cronin (1966) makes a similar point when he argues that for Scotus an esse intelligible, for example a stone, has a relation to the 'divine intellection, whereas yet there is no relation of the divine intellection to the stone', p. 191. Knuuttila (1996) concurs, stressing that 'it is important to notice that the objects of knowledge in the second instant of nature [that is, second subdivision of the first moment], are introduced in esse intelligible and known in themselves directly, without recurrence to what took place in the first instant of nature', p. 136. Normore (1996) argues that for Scotus God creates the basis for logical possibilities, but that the repugnance and non-repugnance of these possibilities are independent of God.

113 For a discussion of divine ideas in Scotus see Gilson (1952b), pp. 279-306.

115 This esse objectivum is esse intelligible.

117 Gilson (1952a), p. 86. Elsewhere Gilson makes the point that God's ideas of creatures 'are not views of His essence nor even of His imitability', Gilson (1991), p. 160.

118 For Ockham's texts see (1967). For relevant translations see Summa Logicae, 2 vols., (1974), (1980); Philosophical Writings (1990); Quodlibetal Questions (1991); Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals (1994). This last contains a translation of part of Ockham's Ordinatio.

119 The exact nature of Ockham's idea of divine Omnipotence is controversial. People such as Courtenay argue that it was a traditional version, in that it did not, in articulating the dichotomy of potentia ordinata/potentia absoluta, employ the latter as a form of action. But it appears that, for Ockham, this capacity is itself active, as everything in the Ockhamian world comes under its constant activity. In this sense potentia absoluta is an axiomatic active capacity. As Ozment (1980) says of the distinction, it is 'the most basic of Ockham's theological tools', p. 38. See Courtenay (1984a) and (1990); Pernoud (1970) and (1972); Adams (1987), pp. 1186-1207; for criticisms of Adams' view see Gelber (1990). Those who argue that the use of the distinction leads to sceptical ends include the following: Kennedy (1983), (1985), (1988) and (1989); Oakley (1961), (1963), (1968) and (1979); Randi (1986) and (1987); Funkenstein (1975a), (1975b), (1986) and (1994); van den Brink (1993). See also Dupre (1993); Gillespie (1995).

120 'Venerable Inceptor' is a name by which William of Ockham goes in the medieval textbooks.

121 See Maurer (1990), p. 370. See also Adams (1987), ch. 24.

Ibid.

McGrade (1985), p. 154. Ordinatio, I, d. 36, q. 1. Maurer (1990), p. 376. See Pegis (1942). Maurer (1990), p. 377.

When Platonism is referred to, its most pejorative interpretation is implied. Pegis (1942).

'There is a science which investigates being, and one science studies a univocal subject', Metaphysics, IV, q. 1, n. 2; 'Scotus works with a notion of being which is common and univocal', Gilson (1952b), p. 454; 'Scotistic metaphysics is constructed on the concept of being because there is no other idea which will permit us to attain God', Gilson (1927), p. 100. See also Shircel (1942); Barth (1965); Hoeres (1965); Marrone (2001), vol. 2, ch. 15. For a discussion of the Scotist essentialising of existence see Gilson (1952a) and (1952b).

The lineage of such a notion may well run from Plotinus, when in the Enneads, he equates being and intelligence; of course the equation of being and thought had been made by Parmenides. This move was taken up by Avicenna who sought to consider essences in an absolute manner. Simultaneously he conceived being as somewhat univocal and accidental; univocal in terms of an irreducible intuition of being, and accidental in that knowledge was not affected by any existential notion of being, as it remained epistemically indifferent to being. Ghent follows Avicenna's lead, for he too considers being in an almost univocal manner, as his analogous concept of being arises from the first impression of the intellect, a la Avicenna, prescinding from determination. Scotus adopts this and extends it. It is not outlandish to see Descartes and Kant on the horizon, although this is not exactly the trajectory of this thesis. This legacy passes easily to the likes of Bertrand Russell: 'Being as that which belongs to every conceivable object of thought . . . Whatever can be thought of has being', Russell (1903), pp. 449, 451.

As Ross (1986) argues, this mode of individuation will fail because it requires 'deeper individuals', p. 328.

On Scotus' notion of formal distinction see Grajewski (1944), Wolter (1965).

Knuuttila and Alanen (1988), p. 2. Lagerlund (2000), p. 110.

Pierre Duhem is traditionally seen as offering a strong interpretation of the Parisian condemnations, while Koyre offers a weaker reading, limiting the extent of their subsequent influence. Grant has recently restated the stronger reading: Duhem (1985); Koyre (1957), (1949), (1956); Grant (1979), (1982), (1985). Murdoch (1974) says the condemnations led to the push of 'questions beyond the confines of the physical possibilities licit within Aristotelian natural philosophy into the broader field of what was logically possible', p. 72. McColley (1936) states that 'There occurred in 1277 one of the most important events recorded in history', p. 399. See also Wippel (1977); Hissette (1977); for an English translation of the Parisian text see Hyman (1983).

146 Knuuttila and Alanen (1988), p. 2.

147 This is the interpretation proffered by the 'Helsinki School', under Hintikka and Knuuttila, his pupil. See Knuuttila (1978), (1981a), (1981b), (1982), (1993), (1995) and (1996); see also Alanen (1985) and (1988); Hintikka (1981). Knuuttila is of the opinion that medieval thinkers employed a statistical understanding of modality, hence a merely extensional one. Klaus Jacobi argues that Aquinas et al. did not hold a merely statistical understanding of modality; see Jacobi (1983), p. 94. Goris (1996) concurs with Jacobi, pp. 257-275. Sylwanowicz (1996) argues that Scotus did not hold an intensional modality as Knuuttila et al. conceive it.

148 Ordinatio, I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4, n. 262; Ordinatio, I, d. 43, q. un, n. 16 (hereafter Ord.).

150 As Vos (1994a) says, 'Possibilitas logica is an irreducible ontological quality of things themselves. Only in so far as the aspect of factuality is concerned is God's will the cause of contingent things . . . The potentialis realis of God is the cause of the factual existence of contingent beings, and is not the cause of their possibilitas logica', p. 30.

151 Ord. I, d. 43, q. 2. See Lagerlund (2000), p. 94.

152 Ord. I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1-2, n. 86; cited by Knuuttila and Alanen (1988), p. 35.

153 Ord. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, n. ad. 2. This encourages Burrell to call this view of contingency 'voluntarist': (1990), p. 252. For a different view of Scotus' understanding of contingent causality see Sylwanowicz (1996).

154 Vos (1994) insists that 'Discovery of synchronic contingency marks the start of Scotus' career as a scholar', and it was this 'synchronic contingency that can be regarded as the cornerstone of so-called possible worlds semantics', pp. 6, 30. On synchronic contingency in Scotus see Vos (1985), (1998a), (1998b); Dumont (1995).

159 Ockham, Sent. I, d. 43, q. 2; cited by Knuuttila and Alanen (1988), p. 38. As Lagerlund puts it: 'For [Ockham] possibility does not depend on the existence of the world or on the existence of God's mind or any other mind'; Lagerlund (2000), p. 92.

162 Ord. I, d. 43, q. 2; cited by Alanen (1985), p. 182.

165 See Scotus, Ord. I, d. 7, q. 1, 27; see Alanen (1985), p. 178.

169 Knuuttila (1996), p. 137. See Ord. I, d. q. 4, n. 262, 268.

172 Suarez (1983), pp. 200-201. On Suarez see Marion (1981). Descartes seems to oppose Suarez on just this point, for it is said by him that God forms truth like a king who lays down rules in his kingdom. Yet, as Marion makes clear, Descartes has not challenged Suarez' basic presupposition, namely, that these ideas are exterior to God; (1981), pp. 134-139. Furthermore, Descartes' protection of the divine transcendence does not stop the Cartesian God from being subjected to other 'laws'. Gillespie (1995) makes the point well: 'Deception . . . is the consequence of imperfection and no such imperfection is found in God. That is to say, deception requires self-consciousness, which is the basis for distinguishing oneself from others. God, however, is not self-conscious. God thus is no deceiver . . . [Descartes'] God is an impotent God, not an omnipotent God, a God who has lost his independence and become a mere representation within human thinking', pp. 61-62. See also Marion (1998).

174 Knuuttila and Alanen (1988), p. 41.

176 As Cronin (1966) says about Scotus: 'He inherits from and maintains the essentially platonic thesis of Avicenna and of Henry of Ghent, namely, that for whatever is conceivably intelligible there is given that conceivably intelligible essence', p. 199. Van der Lecq (1998) concludes that 'Scotus commits himself to a certain kind of reality of the possibles', p. 97. These possibles are, as McGrade (1985) argues, 'really nothing. They are beyond being', p. 154. For the Platonic legacy of Avicenna, Ghent, Scotus and Ockham, see Paulus (1938), p. 135; Pegis (1942); Gilson (1952b), p. 111. (It may be more accurate to describe this legacy as Neoplatonic.)

178 See Alanen (1985), p. 175; see also Karger (1980), pp. 250, 256.

179 If Henry of Ghent had intended to overcome the necessitarianism of Avicennian essences, which must in being possible become realised, he did so (as did Scotus and Ockham) by letting them exist necessarily in the a priori realm of logical possibility. Avicenna's essences do in the end retain their necessity, doing so in being a nothing as something.

180 In a sense we can begin to read Kafka's tale 'Before the Law', as an allegory depicting modernity's death of God.

181 'Henry was but a hair's breadth from the strictly logical definition Duns would later provide', Marrone (1996), p. 184; see also Marrone (1988).

182 As Blumenberg (1983) says, reality 'became an amorphous sea of particulars, on which the concept creating understanding had to set up orientation marks', p. 519. This is what Blumenberg calls Ockham's 'phenomenalism', ibid., p. 189.

183 Gilson (1952b), p. 248; italics mine.

184 Burrell (1990), p. 118. Blumenberg (1983) refers to the notion of a plurality of worlds as: 'The idea [which] was to become one of the essential factors in the disintegration of the metaphysical idea of the cosmos, preparatory to the modern age', p. 156.

185 See Boehner (1958), pp. 96-110; see also Adams (1977), pp. 144-176.

187 Ibid.

192 McGrade (1985), p. 154. McGrade is here playing on Gershwin's Porgy and Bess.

199 See Lovejoy (1960).

206 Schmidt (1966), p. 318. According to Schmidt, Aquinas does understand logic as intensional, but only on a 'secondary plane', ibid.

207 On ens infinitum see Catania (1993).

208 Quodlibetal Questions, q. 5.57; italics mine. The language of 'capture' resonates with Plotinian audacity.

215 Quodlibetal Questions, q. 5.57; italics mine.

217 As Caffarena puts it: 'Entire la téologia natural de San Tomas, centrada alrededor del Ser Subsistente, en que la Infinitud como nota expresa no juega papel preponderante, y la de Duns Escoto, toda centrada en al Ens Infinitum, puede ocupar un puesto intermedio, que explique en parte la evolucion, Enrique De Gante'; quoted by Davenport (1999), p. 99, fn. 39; see also Caffarena (1958).

219 Davenport (1999), p. 152. For Ghent's understanding of infinity see Gilson (1952b), p. 208.

220 See Davenport (1999), which is an examination of the idea of this intensive infinite.

221 See Summa Contra Gentile, 1, 43.

223 See Vignaux (1976), pp. 264, 497; Bonansea (1983), pp. 135-138.

225 See Quodlibetal Questions, q. 5; Tractatus de Primo Principio, chapter 3.

227 For an excellent analysis of quantitative logic see Guénon (1953), (2002).

233 Quodlibetal Questions, V.

235 Quodlibetal Questions, V; italics mine.

238 Te Velde (1998).

240 Goodchild (2001), p. 164; see also Smith (2001).

Was this article helpful?

0 0

Post a comment